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This paper investigates the e⁄ect of applying gender quotas on policy decisions. I ￿rst examine
the e⁄ect of gender quotas on the representation of female legislators, study the correlation between
gender quotas and di⁄erent types of government expenditures, and then use quotas as an instrument
for the proportion of female legislators to investigate the e⁄ect of female legislators on policy outcomes.
The results show that an increase in the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases
the ratio of government expenditure on health and social welfare to GDP by 0.18 and 0.67 percentage
points, respectively. The robustness check supports that the e⁄ect of quotas on female legislators is
likely to be translated into the in￿ uence of female policymakers on social welfare.
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1 Introduction
An increasing number of countries are currently introducing various types of gender quotas in public
elections to reach a gender balance in political institutions. Most developing countries introduced electoral
gender quotas during the 1990s, mainly due to the in￿ uence of the UN Conference on Women held in
Beijing. On the other hand, most developed countries adopted gender quotas 10 or 15 years prior to the
Conference. 1 A dramatic change has taken place in the established rank order of countries regarding the
level of women￿ s political representation. The ￿ve Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden), which for many years were almost alone at the top of the list, are now being challenged
by amazingly fast development in a number of countries around the globe. In 2007, Rwanda superseded
Sweden as number one in the world in terms of women￿ s parliamentary representation - 48.75% women
against Sweden￿ s 47.28%.
The core idea behind the gender quota systems is to recruit women into political positions and to ensure
that women are not isolated in political life. The evidence suggests that women tend to have systematically
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1In response to mandates made at the Beijing UN Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, greater advances
were made with respect to governmental institutionalization for the promotion of women￿ s rights in developing
countries.
1di⁄erent preferences for household spending and in particular prefer investing in human capital for their
children, along with spending on what might be considered necessities, such as food, education, and health
care. 2 The incorporation of women￿ s concerns in decision-making would, thereby, improve the nature of
the public sphere. In addition, women￿ s representation can also have an indirect in￿ uence by increasing
men￿ s attention to policies concerning women and children. According to the ￿critical mass￿argument
(Kanter (1977)), the in￿ uence from female legislators on policy decisions is not negligible when there is
a signi￿cant presence of women in the legislature. Quota systems therefore aim at ensuring that women
constitute a certain number or percentage of the members of a body, whether it is a candidate list, a
parliamentary assembly, a committee, or a government.
Theoretically, if the candidates do not commit to implement speci￿c policies once elected, the identity of
the legislator matters for policy determination (Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996)).
This in￿ uence on policy increases as there is increasing political representation of a group. Therefore, if
gender quota systems lead to a pronounced increase in women￿ s representation in politics, we should observe
that government gives higher weights to policy outcomes related to women￿ s concerns after introducing
a gender quota system. This line of models has been applied by Pande (2003) and Chattopadhyay and
Du￿ o (2004). Both of these studies investigate the e⁄ect of female legislators on policy outcomes in India,
and state that the role of political reservations for women provides disadvantaged groups in￿ uence over
policy-making.
However, existing empirical studies focus on the e⁄ect of political reservations on policy outcomes in
the case of an individual country. 3 Do quotas work as well in general? Some countries take gender
quotas as a symbolic policy to re￿ ect the demand for gender equality without making related changes in
institutions. The use of quotas is thereby not su¢ cient to ensure high levels of women in parliament. 4
On the other hand, a high level of representation might be achieved without quotas, such as that achieved
in Nordic countries. Quotas were not introduced in the Nordic countries until women had already reached
about 25% of the seats in 1970s. I therefore ￿rst investigate the e⁄ect of quotas on the representation of
women in parliament. Taking the introduction of quotas as an exogenous source of variation, I can thereby
compare women￿ s representation before and after the policy is applied.
I then examine government spending on di⁄erent functions before and after the introduction of quotas
to check whether political reservations have increased expenditures on groups that should bene￿t from the
mandate. Under the assumption that gender quotas have neither a direct impact on policy outcomes nor
an in￿ uence on policy outcomes through channels other than the proportion of female legislators, I use
gender quotas as an instrument for female legislators and study the e⁄ect of female legislators on policy
outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background of gender quota
2For example, see Davis (1997), Schwindt-Bayer (2007), Thomas (1994), and W￿ngenrud (2000).
3For example, see Pande (2003) and Chattopadhyay and Du￿ o (2004).
4See Dahlerup (2006).
2systems adopted around the world. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and data collection. Section
4 presents the results of the analysis, including the e⁄ect of gender quotas on the representation of women
in politics and the correlation between gender quotas and policy outcomes. In this section, I also discuss
whether gender quotas in￿ uence policy outcomes through its e⁄ect on the proportion of female legislators.
Section 5 provides robustness checks. First, I check if an omitted variable, due to a civil war, a⁄ects for
the results. Then I discuss whether the results are driven by traditional OECD countries. Finally, I use
another panel dataset with fewer countries but more observations per country to re-examine the e⁄ect of
gender quotas. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 What are quotas?
Quotas for women are a form of a¢ rmative action to help them overcome the obstacles that prevent
them from entering politics in the same way as their male colleagues. There are di⁄erent types of quotas.
According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA),
the main distinction based on the mandating is between voluntary party quotas and legal gender quotas.
5
Voluntary party quotas are adopted by political parties, and are set by the parties themselves to guar-
antee the nomination of a certain number or proportion of women. In some countries, such as Argentina,
Bolivia, Germany, Italy, Norway and Sweden, a number of political parties have some types of quotas.
Though there are also some countries with only one or two parties using quotas, it may have a signi￿cant
impact on the overall rate of female representation if the leading party uses a quota. It has also been
suggested that traditional political parties will feel forced to nominate more women if one of their political
competitors, usually a smaller party to the left, starts to promote the representation of women (Matland
and Studlar (1996)). Nevertheless, most of the world￿ s political parties do not employ any kind of quotas
at all.
Legal gender quotas are mandated either by the constitution or by the electoral law. 6 By de￿nition,
both forms are based on legal provisions, obliging all political entities participating in elections to apply
them equally. Non-compliance with legislative or constitutional quotas can result in penalties for those
political entities that do not apply them. 7 Even if constitutional amendments and new electoral laws
5See the website of IDEA, http://www.quotaproject.org/. In each type of gender quota system, quotas may
target the ￿rst stage of the selection process, i.e., the stage of ￿nding aspirants, the second stage of the actual
nomination of candidates to be placed on the ballot by the party, and the third stage of reserved seats for women.
This study only considers whether a quota system is introduced in a country, and who has mandated the quota
system.
6For example, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Uganda have adopted constitutional quotas, and many countries in Latin
America have adopted legislative quotas.
7Examples of sanctions issued by the legal authorities of a country can range from disqualifying candidates to the
imposition of ￿nes, and can include the disquali￿cation of the entire party. See ￿Designing for Equality￿ , published
by IDEA in 2007.
3providing gender quotas may seem more commanding, it is not at all evident that these methods are more
e¢ cient than political party quotas in increasing the number of women in parliament. The e⁄ectiveness of
these initiatives depends on the actual rules and the possible sanctions for non-compliance, as well as on
the general crucial issue like whether there is any rule considering the rank order of women candidates on
the ballot. However, quotas may be introduced after a heated debate, but then have no e⁄ect on increasing
women￿ s representation because there are no mechanisms to ensure their implementation.
2.2 The world of quotas
Dahlerup (2006) de￿nes two di⁄erent tracks to equal political representation for women and men, which are
the incremental track and the fast track. While the incremental track, such as what is used in Scandinavia,
rests on a gradual increase in women￿ s overall resources and on gradual historical changes in the perceptions
of womanhood, the fast track represents a historical leap forward in women￿ s representation, such as those
used in Latin America.
It took approximately 60 years for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to exceed the 20% threshold, and
70 years to reach 30% female representation in parliament. 8 However, quotas were not introduced
among these countries until women had already reached about 25% of the seats in 1980s, which was, at
that time, also the highest proportions in the world. Women mobilized and organized pressure to ensure
that political parties increased their number of women candidates in order to give women candidates a fair
chance of winning, which would change the political agenda as well as the climate and working procedures
of political institutions. 9 In other words, quotas are not only for minimum requirements, but also for
gender balance in this area. Moreover, no legal quotas in Nordic countries force all political parties to
nominate a certain minimum of women on their lists, nor is the mere principle of equality between women
and men included in the constitutions. Only some political parties and today only in Norway, Iceland, and
Sweden are there quotas for public election, with other political parties strongly rejecting the idea.
Similar tracks can be found within other developed countries in Western Europe, North America,
Australia, and New Zealand. 10 Increasing awareness of gender imbalances in political representation,
political parties and national legislatures across the region have taken steps over the last 20 years to
promote women￿ s access to political o¢ ce through party quotas and legal quotas. These policies have a
much longer history than similar policies in other regions of the world, with many being adopted 10 or
15 years prior to the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. In all countries, these policies
originated with women in civil society and inside the political parties, who presented gender quotas as a
way to win support among female voters. 11 Left-wing parties are usually the ￿rst to pursue gender
8See Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie (2006).
9In a 1984 survey among all women￿ s sections and equality committees within the Nordic political parties, all,
except for one ￿maybe￿ , expressed the view that more women in politics would change the political agenda as
well as the climate and working procedures of political institutions. However, many added ￿but only if there are a
su¢ cient number of women￿(Dahlerup (1988)).
10See Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires (2006).
11A new party may adopt gender quotas when seeking to establish an initial basis of support, while an existing
4quotas. Nevertheless, voluntary party quotas may be ine⁄ective so countries often turn to legal quotas,
such as was the case in France. Quotas laws in France were adopted largely with the consensus of all
parties in parliament, most of whom were concerned not to appear ￿out of touch￿on the issue of women
and politics. Belgium and France are only two countries with legal quotas among the developed countries.
In contrast, the fast track method is contrary to the idea of gradual improvement in women￿ s repre-
sentation if women do not have the same political resources as men, which is a common situation among
developing countries. The responsibility for dealing with the under-representation of women rests with
the political institutions. In line with this conception of women￿ s under-representation, mandated quotas
for the recruitment and election of female candidates are needed. In 1990 the UN Economic and Social
Council endorsed a target of 30% women in decision-making positions in the world by 1995. However, in
1995, only 10% of the world￿ s parliamentary members were women. The Beijing Platform in 1995, on the
other hand, has been very in￿ uential, and women￿ s movements all over the world have attempted to give
the controversial demand for gender quotas legitimacy by referring to the Platform for Action.
Latin America is the leading continent when it comes to the introduction of gender quotas in politics
after the Beijing Platform. 12 Eleven out of 19 Latin American countries have approved the quota
system in legal or constitutional acts aimed at promoting greater gender equality in political parliamentary
representation. All countries adopted them between 1996 and 2000, with the exception of Argentina, which
acted earlier in 1991. Around the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s in Latin America, the
main focus was on achieving political rights and guaranteeing constitutional civil rights. Although some
important changes have occurred in the social and economic pro￿le of women in the region, such as an
increase in life expectancy, education level, employment, and non-discrimination laws, economic reforms
aiming at reduced public spending had a signi￿cantly negative impact on women￿ s living conditions.
The epicenter of Latin American women￿ s struggles during this period was therefore the process of re-
democratization, strategically focused on enforcing their rights as women and as citizens in the political
and social dimensions.
Since the early 1990s, women in most African countries have been increasingly forming and heading up
political parties, running for the presidency, and they have become active in local politics. 13 The large
majority of quotas in Africa were introduced after 1995, the year of the UN Conference on Women held
in Beijing. Countries with higher representation of women due to quotas were more likely to be newly
independent countries coming out of recent civil war or wars of liberation. The in￿ uence of civil con￿ ict
has perhaps served as an impetus to introduce legal quotas because it is easier to put questions of gender
representation on the table. On the other hand, democratic countries tend to favor party-based quotas
rather than reserved seats or constitutionally mandated quotas. Despite this, there has been perhaps a
greater reliance on constitutionally mandated reserved seats in Africa compared with other regions in the
party may adopt it for aiming to overcome a string of electoral losses.
12See Araœjo and Garc￿a (2006).
13See Tripp, KonatØ, and Lowe-Morna (2006).
5world. This may re￿ ect, in these instances, a greater concern for guaranteed outcomes in terms of female
representation and a lack of con￿dence in party compliance or initiative.
Other regions in the world are without a clear categorization of track. Countries in the Balkans did
not allow questions regarding gender equality and political participation of women to be raised in any of
the respective countries in early 1990s, during the transitional period. 14 Gender quotas were gradually
accepted within the parties in these areas after the release of the Beijing Platform for Action. Voluntary
party quotas were ￿rst installed mostly by the left-wing parties, but most of them were neither fully applied
nor e⁄ective. Therefore, female activists from the left and centre-left parties started to advocate for legal
quotas, through which women are believed to achieve more political power. The Arab region is another
without clear categorization. 15 Arab societies use all possible means to entrench their value-based
heritage, by promoting customs and traditions that curb women￿ s activities and con￿ne their existence to
the framework of the family. The majority of Arab countries do not apply gender quotas because of the
sectarian division of the ruling powers. However, women￿ s representation in parliament may still be high
if there is sponsorship from the government, such as in Syria. 16 Tunisia, on the other hand, adopted
voluntary party quotas and has the highest percentage of women in parliament of the Arab countries.
In sum, to elect women by the fast track may lead to rapid results with regard to the representation
of women in politics, but the e⁄ect on policy outcomes may not be clear if these women legislators are
elected with no power base in their party, civic organizations, or constituencies. Therefore, it would be
more convincing to examine whether the quota system in￿ uences policies by including as many countries
as possible and also considering countries with both the fast track and the incremental track.
3 Empirical strategy and data
3.1 Empirical strategy
I apply a Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erence approach to investigate the e⁄ect of gender quota systems. I collect two
observations for each variable in each country, one before and the other one after the introduction of gender
quotas. These two time-points are distant from each other for the purpose of looking at the long term
impact of quotas on female legislators and on policy outcomes. If the time-points are too close to each
other, say, a 5-year di⁄erence, there may be negligible change in the government budget and no change
of the representation of women in politics due to the same election period. Moreover, gender quotas may
not have an immediate political impact. 17 Using this approach I study whether gender quotas in￿ uence
women￿ s representation in politics, and also examine whether there is correlation between the variation of
government expenditures in di⁄erent policy outcomes and gender quotas.
14See Anti· c and Lokar (2006).
15See Abou-Zeid (2006).
16The proportion of female legislators in the Syrian parliament is the second highest of all Arab states, although
no quotas are applied.
17The e⁄ect of gender quotas on the level of female legislators in the fast track may be the only exception.
6I consider the following empirical speci￿cations:
FEMi;t = ￿1;i + ￿1;t + ￿1Quotasi;t + ￿1Xi;t + "1;i;t (1)
EXPi;t = ￿2;i + ￿2;t + ￿2Quotasi;t + ￿2Xi;t + "2;i;t (2)
where i denotes country indices and t denotes time indices. Quotas is a binary indicator, denoting whether
the country applies gender quotas. FEM denotes the proportion of women in the lower chamber and EXP
denotes policy outcomes. ￿i denotes the country ￿xed e⁄ect, which controls for unobserved permanent
di⁄erences in the dependent variables. Similarly, ￿t captures the post-e⁄ect of gender quotas on the
dependent variables. Xi;t is a set of control variables, such as real GDP per capita and year. Real GDP
per capita is included because it is suggested that countries with better economic conditions may be more
likely to adopt gender quotas and/or have more women in politics. I control for year, which captures
the in￿ uence of duration between two observations in individual country after the ￿rst di⁄erence, since
sampling occurred in di⁄erent years for di⁄erent countries. 18 In addition, I am concerned about the
non-linear trend of the proportion of female legislators, i.e., female representation may increase enormously
after the introduction of gender quotas. Thereafter, I control for the quadratic term of duration after the
￿rst di⁄erence.
Under the assumption that gender quotas have neither direct impact on policy outcomes nor in￿ uence
on policy outcomes through channels other than the fraction of female legislators, gender quotas are a valid
instrument for the proportion of female legislators and can be used to study the e⁄ect of female legislators
on policy outcomes. The empirical speci￿cation is as following:
EXPi;t = ai + bt + rFEMi;t + dXi;t + ￿i;t (3)
where ai re￿ ects country dummies and bt re￿ ects the post-e⁄ect of gender quotas. According to Two Stage
Least Squares (TSLS), the estimate of the average e⁄ect is the ratio between the reduced form e⁄ect to




The dataset used here includes 103 countries between 1970 and 2006, which contains 22 countries with
legal gender quotas, 47 countries with voluntary party quotas and 43 countries without any type of gender
quotas. Most developed countries introduced gender quotas in the 1980s, while most developing countries
adopted gender quotas in the 1990s. The data for the existence of gender quotas are collected from
International IDEA, and are reported in Table 1. The website of International IDEA provides information
about the type of gender quota system adopted, political party adopting quotas, and the year of adoption
for each country. For the countries that introduced any type of gender quotas, the variable Quotas takes
18For example, the beginning and ending year for Argentina are 1976 and 2004, respectively. I include these
controls in equation (1) and equation (2). The duration for Argentina is therefore 24 years.
7a value of 1 in the year when they were ￿rst introduced. For voluntary party quotas, the variable Quotas
takes a value of 1 in the year when the ￿rst political party applied gender quotas. 19 I then collect
comparable data on other variables based on Quotas.
The measure of female involvement in politics mainly comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union￿ s
survey, Women in Parliaments: 1945-1995. 20 This publication lists the proportion of parliamentary
seats held by women in each country. I only consider women￿ s representation in the lower chamber. 21
Furthermore, policy outcomes refer to consolidated central government expenditures on general public
service, defense, health, education, housing, economic a⁄airs, and social services and welfare. 22 They
are reported in Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Yearbook issued by the IMF. I divide these values
by the GDP and multiply the result by 100.
Figure 1 provides the details of these expenses provided by the Government Finance Statistics Manual
2001. Based on the survey by political scientists, female legislators tend to focus on legislation dealing
with issues related to traditional concerns of women. 23 Therefore, I would expect to see a positive e⁄ect
of female legislators on education, health, and social welfare since they are categories related to children
and the family. Moreover, women are less likely to support government expenditures on defense, and may
exert a negative in￿ uence on such expenditures given the need for budget balance. 24 However, the
directions of the signs of women￿ s in￿ uence on general public service, housing, and economic a⁄airs are
not clear.
4 Results
Table 2 provides mean percentage points of women￿ s representation in politics and expenditures on policy
outcomes to GDP before and after applying gender quotas. The treatment, Quotas, equals 1 if the country
adopts or has adopted any type of gender quotas in the national elections. There are only small di⁄erences
in the mean proportion of female legislators among countries before the treatment. The female proportion
prior to treatment is 6.24% for the treatment group and 6.23% for the control group including OECD
countries, while it is 5.82% for the treatment group and 5.98% for the control group without OECD
19I categorize countries that have applied any type of quotas, but later abolished them, in the treatment group
by assuming a continuous e⁄ect of gender quotas. For example, Denmark applied party quotas between 1977 and
1996, and legal quotas between 1988 and 1990. Other such cases are: Egypt, which applied legal quotas between
1979 and 1986; Italy, which applied legal quotas between 1993 and 1997; and Venezuela, which applied legal quotas
between 1997 and 2000.
20The series after 1995 are collected from the website of IPU.
21According to IPU, there are no statistics of the level of women in the upper house for previous elections for
some countries with a bicameral system because members of this chamber are not elected through universal direct
su⁄rage. I therefore take into account only women￿ s representation in the lower chamber.
22I consider only those categories that exist continuously during the sample periods. Other items, such as public
order and safety, environment protection, recreation, and culture and religion, are ignored because they are either
not de￿ned in the early period or not reported for most of the countries.
23For example, see Thomas (1994), Davis (1997), W￿ngenrud (2000), and Schwindt-Bayer (2007).
24Davis (1997) points out that women never held positions in the sector of defense in government between 1968
and 1992 in Western European countries.
8countries. 25 Even though the number of women in politics grows over time, there exist di⁄erences
between groups after the treatment. The average level of female legislators for countries after applying
gender quotas is about 1.52 times as large as that for countries without adopting any type of quota system.
This number is about 1.31 times larger in the treatment group than in the control group when OECD
countries are excluded. Therefore, gender quotas may explain the growing participation of women in
politics.
Nevertheless, there is concern about the endogeneity problem of introducing gender quotas, which
would result in selection bias. It is suggested that countries adopting gender quotas may be also countries
with higher GDP per capita and/or with more social concerns. Figure 2 shows a positive correlation
between the change in the proportion of female legislators and the change in real GDP per capita for all
countries in the sample, including treatment and control groups. However, this correlation does not seem
to be driven by certain groups of countries. For example, the correlation line may become a bit ￿ atter
by dropping those countries with an increasing proportion of female legislators of more than 25%, such as
Austria, Belgium, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain. Or, it may be a bit steeper if Hungary
and Zimbabwe are excluded. No matter the case, the correlation line would not be in￿ uenced very much.
In other words, selection bias due to the level of economic development is not likely to be a serious problem
in this study.
Given countries with gender quotas, most of the traditional OECD countries introduced voluntary
party quotas, while most of the developing countries introduced legal gender quotas. Does a country￿ s
choice of gender quota system relate to economic growth? Figure 3 and 4 present the relationship between
the change in the proportion of female legislators and the change in real GDP per capita for countries
adopting voluntary party quotas and legal gender quotas, respectively. In Figure 3, the correlation line
might have a parallel downward shift if some OECD countries were excluded, such as Austria, Belgium,
Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain. In Figure 4, the correlation line may become ￿ atter if
South Korea is dropped. On average, most countries have an economic growth rate around 0-1% and an
increasing proportion of female legislators of around 0-30% during the sample period, no matter which type
of gender quota system is introduced. Although the graphs are very suggestive, it seems that a country￿ s
choice of a gender quota system is not biased according to economic growth.
The e⁄ect of gender quotas on the proportion of female legislators, which is estimated by equation
(1), is reported in Table 3. Here I include all countries. There is a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect of gender
quotas on the share of female legislators. In general, the proportion of female legislators in countries after
adopting gender quotas is 5.03 percentage points higher than that in countries without any type of gender
quota. I then investigate the e⁄ect of gender quotas considering the types of systems and present the
results in column (2). Voluntary party quotas, relative to legal gender quotas, seem to be more relevant to
25OECD refers to Northern and Western European countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States. I only consider these countries as OECD countries for the purpose of controlling their similar historical
socio-economic background, which may have e⁄ect on women￿ s representation in politics and on policy outcomes.
Moreover, it is also for the purpose of matching countries with the incremental track as de￿ned by Dahlerup (2006).
9the representation of women in politics. Since political parties adopt voluntary party quotas voluntarily,
it is less likely that quotas will be a symbolic policy. In addition, electoral campaigns may strengthen the
e⁄ect of voluntary party quotas on women￿ s representation in politics since political parties without quotas
may feel forced to nominate more women. Generally, the proportion of female legislators in countries with
voluntary party quotas is 4.18 percentage points higher than that in countries without party quotas.
Do gender quotas in￿ uence policy outcomes? In Table 2, the mean percentage of GDP for expenditures
on health, education, and social welfare, which are categories suggested to be women￿ s concerns, are mostly
increasing over time whether or not OECD countries are included. Even though expenditures on health are
lower for the treatment group before gender quotas are applied, it is 1.35 times larger than the expenditures
for the control group after the treatment. The same pattern emerges in spending on education; spending
for the control group is higher than that for treatment group before the treatment, but it increases at a
faster rate for the treatment group after the treatment. For the expenditures on social welfare, there is
a more pronounced rise of its share of GDP within the treatment group. 26 There is also an increase
in expenditures for general public service, and decreased spending on defense and economic a⁄airs. The
average share of expenditures on housing increases for non-OECD countries, but the pattern is not clear
when OECD countries are taken into account.
An estimation of equation (2) including all countries is reported in Table 3. The results given in column
(1) show that gender quotas are only relevant to social service and welfare among policy outcomes. On
average, countries, after introducing gender quotas, tend to spend 3.38 percentage points more on social
welfare than those countries without gender quotas. Even though the coe¢ cients are not signi￿cant, gender
quotas are also positively correlated with other policy outcomes that concern women, such as health and
education. Column (2) provides the results considering the types of gender quota systems. Voluntary
party quotas are relevant to social welfare in that the share of government expenditures on social welfare is
3.55 percentage points higher in countries adopting voluntary party quotas than that in countries without
party quotas. Since voluntary party quotas are usually 1) adopted ￿rst; 2) mostly by left-wing parties,
which have been suggested to prefer policies about social welfare more than right-wing parties; and 3) are
more relevant to the representation of female legislators, who are more likely to give priority to legislation
re￿ ecting women￿ s preferences, it may explain the e⁄ectiveness of party quotas on government expenditures
on social welfare. 27
Although there is a reduced form e⁄ect of gender quotas on government expenditures on social welfare,
it would not necessarily extend to the e⁄ect of gender quotas on policy outcomes by its encouragement of
greater participation of women in politics. Countries with gender quotas may be more liberal in general,
and therefore would devote a higher share of government expenditures to social welfare. It may also be the
26Even though the average proportion of expenditures on social welfare for countries with legal quotas is less
than that for the control group after the treatment, the growth rate is 74% for the treatment group and only 20%
for the control group.
27Welfare State Expansion is one of the criteria to map the left positioning of a political party. For example,
Budge, Ian, Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Volkens, Andrea, L. Bara, Judith and Eric Tanenbaum (2001), ￿Mapping
Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998￿ , Oxford University Press.
10case that male politicians in countries with gender quotas come under pressure to support policies related
to women￿ s concerns in order to decrease the chance of electoral loss. Nevertheless, it would be interesting
to investigate the question of whether the increase of women￿ s representation in politics, which results
from adopting gender quotas, leads to more spending on policies related to women￿ s traditional role in
the family. Under the assumption that gender quotas have neither direct impact on policy outcomes nor
in￿ uence on policy outcomes through channels other than increasing the proportion of female legislators,
gender quotas are a valid instrument for female legislators and can be used to study the e⁄ect of female
legislators on policy outcomes.
Table 4 provides the estimation of equation (3). Column (1) presents the results using gender quotas
as an instrument for female legislators, while column (2) contains the results considering the types of
quota systems and taking both as the instruments. I also report that the conditional p-value for the
estimate, given by the STATA command condivreg, indicates robust results. 28 In the case with gender
quotas as the instrument, there is an e⁄ect of female legislators on health and social welfare based on the
conditional p-value. An increase in the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases the
ratio of government expenditures on health and social welfare to GDP by 0.18 and 0.67 percentage points,
respectively. In the case that considers di⁄erent types of gender quota systems, female legislators are
relevant only to the expenditures on social welfare. On average, female legislators exert positive in￿ uences
on health, education, and social welfare, and yield negative in￿ uences on defense, which is expected.
To further examine of the casual e⁄ect of the share of women in politics, rather than gender quotas,
on policy outcomes, I ￿rst compare the ratio of estimate value of ￿2 to ￿1with r. In addition, the estimate
of the reduced form, i.e., equation (2), would be as signi￿cant as the estimate by applying TSLS if gender
quotas are a good instrument. Both of the conditions are satis￿ed with government expenditures on social
welfare. In other words, gender quotas may in￿ uence government expenditures on social welfare through
their e⁄ect on the proportion of female legislators.
5 Robustness check
5.1 Does civil war matter?
Countries belonging to the fast track of gender equality in politics mostly came out of civil war or wars of
liberation during the 1980s and early 1990s, which may result in enhanced eagerness for achieving political
rights and guaranteeing constitutional civil rights. Additionally, it may be easier for these countries to
introduce mandated political reserved seats for women. This raises a doubt about whether the presence of
civil war is an omitted variable in this study. To simplify the analysis, I consider only ￿gender quotas￿in
28The p-value and con￿dence interval for the parameter on the endogenous regressor could be incorrect if the
instruments are weak. Condivreg reports the conditional likelihood ratio con￿dence region and p-value, both of
which are robust to potentially weak instruments. The estimate by the limited information maximum likelihood
(LIML) is exactly the same as the estimate by the two stage least squares method in this case.
11this section and control for civil war. War refers to intra-state war with an ending year between 1970 and
the year introducing a gender quota system, which is collected from the Correlates of War (COW) and is
included as a binary indicator here.
Estimation of equation (1) and (2) is given in Table 5. Column (1) replicates the results from column
(1) in Table 3, which is taken as the baseline results. I then control for War and present the results
in column (2). The conclusions remain the same, i.e., gender quotas have an important impact on the
increasing proportion of female legislators and there is a relevant reduced form e⁄ect of gender quotas
on government expenditures on social welfare. Under the assumption that gender quotas in￿ uence policy
choices only through higher levels of women in politics, I represent the proportion of female legislators with
gender quotas and investigate the e⁄ect of female legislators on policy outcomes. The results are reported
in column (2) of Table 6. There is an e⁄ect of female legislators on health and social welfare based on the
conditional p-value. An increase in the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases the
ratio of government expenditures on health and social welfare to GDP by 0.18 and 0.70 percentage points,
respectively.
Similarly, socioeconomic background may in￿ uence a country￿ s choice of adopting gender quotas, which
may bias the results. In most of the African countries, civil con￿ icts came to an end and women became
active in politics in the early 1990s. In Latin American countries, women struggled for their rights as
women and citizens in the political and social dimensions when economic reforms by the end of the 1980s
and the beginning of the 1990s aimed at reduced public spending had a signi￿cantly negative impact on
women￿ s living conditions. Since a dramatic change of the rank order at the level of women￿ s representation
in politics happened after countries in these two regions introduced gender quotas, it raises doubt about
whether the results are driven by African countries and Latin American countries. 29 In column (3)
of Table 5 I drop African countries and in column (4) of Table 5 I also drop Latin American countries.
Excluding both African and Latin American countries, there is still a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of
gender quotas on the share of female legislators, and a relevant reduced form e⁄ect of gender quotas on
government expenditures on social welfare. Furthermore, the greater the share of female legislators, the
higher the ratio of social welfare expenditures to GDP (this result is shown in column (4) of Table 6.).
Overall, an omitted variable attributed to civil war does not drive the conclusions.
5.2 Do OECD countries drive the results?
There are 21 traditional OECD countries included in this study. 30 Most of them adopted party quotas,
and only New Zealand and the United States are without any ￿rm type of gender quotas. 31 These
29There are 6 African countries and 3 Latin American countries in the top 20 countries ranked by women in the
parliament in 2008. Other countries on this list are traditional OECD countries.
30They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
31Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires (2006) de￿ne the quota system in these two countries as ￿soft quotas￿ . The aim
of soft quotas is to increase women￿ s representation more directly through informal targets and recommendations.
12traditional OECD countries were, for long, at the top of the list of an established rank order of countries
according to the level of women￿ s political representation, and their better economic development may
re￿ ect di⁄erent preferences on policies relative to non-OECD countries. This raises doubt about whether
OECD countries are driving the e⁄ect of gender quotas. I therefore re-examine the e⁄ect of gender quotas
excluding these traditional OECD countries.
An estimation of equation (1) excluding OECD countries is reported in Table 7. Compared with the
results in Table 3, the in￿ uence of gender quotas on the level of female legislators is smaller, but still
signi￿cant. 32 With regard to the types of quotas, column (2) shows that legal quotas have a relatively
higher and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the level of female legislators. This may capture the phenomenon that
developing countries usually improve women￿ s representation in politics through the fast track. Most
developing countries did not adopt gender quotas until the UN Conference on Women held in Beijing in
1995, and therefore experienced a signi￿cant jump in the share of female legislators after implementing
legal gender quotas, such as in Latin American and African countries.
Estimation of equation (2), excluding OECD countries, is reported in Table 7. There is signi￿cant
correlation between gender quotas and social welfare, but the scale is smaller than the case including all
countries. Column (2) reports the results considering the types of gender quota systems. Voluntary party
quotas are relevant to social welfare in that the share of government expenditures on social welfare is
2.32 percentage points higher in those countries adopting voluntary party quotas, as compared to those
countries without party quotas.
Table 8 reports the estimation of equation (3). Column (1) provides the results using gender quotas
as an instrument for female legislators, while column (2) presents the results taking both types of quota
systems as instruments. When OECD countries are excluded, there is only an e⁄ect of female legislators
on social welfare expenditure based on the conditional p-value. This implies that social welfare concerns
women generally, even among non-OECD countries. In the case that considers di⁄erent types of gender
quota systems, female legislators are irrelevant to any policy outcome.
Overall, gender quotas have an important e⁄ect on the share of female legislators, and the result not
driven by the OECD countries. Legal quotas, relative to voluntary party quotas, are more important when
interpreting the representation of women in politics among developing countries. In addition, the e⁄ect of
quotas on female legislators is likely to be translated into the in￿ uence of female policymakers on social
welfare.
5.3 A smaller panel dataset: do trends matter?
To reduce the risk of biased estimates resulting from di⁄erent time period backgrounds, in this section
I consider a ￿ner dataset containing only countries with a beginning sampling year before 1980 and an
It facilitates access, but does not necessarily mandate outcomes. For example, in the U.S., the presence of soft
quotas has not translated into any great gains in legislative representation.
32The results of the other speci￿cation with quotas, OECD, and their interaction as independent variables show
that gender quotas pass the joint F-test and has a strongly signi￿cant e⁄ect on the level of female politicians.
13ending sampling year after 2000. Moreover, I collect two more observations around the year 1985 and the
year 1995 for each country to capture the trend of policy outcomes and women￿ s representation in politics.
33 The panel dataset in this section therefore covers 49 countries between 1970 and 2006, and contains
12 countries with legal gender quotas, 29 countries with voluntary party quotas, and 15 countries without
any type of gender quotas. 34 Figure 5 provides a simple graphic illustration of the relationship between
gender quotas and the average proportion of female legislators. The line with points indicates the treatment
group, i.e., countries with gender quotas, and the line with triangles indicates the control group. Most
traditional OECD countries introduced gender quotas during mid-1980s, and most developing countries
introduced gender quotas during 1990s. While some caution is needed in interpreting this graph since no
other factors are being controlled, the ￿gure shows that the average proportion of female legislators grows
faster in the treatment group than in the control group. The di⁄erences in the share of female legislators
between two groups are 3.6 percentage points in 1970s, 6.7 percentage points in 1980s, 9.4 percentage
points in 1990s, and 11.3 percentage points in 2000s. Gender quotas may be the factor resulting in this
growing di⁄erence.
The following empirical speci￿cations provide a more systematic investigation of the e⁄ect of gender
quotas, which are similar to equation (1), (2) and (3), but including this trend.
FEMi;t = ￿1;i + ￿1;t + ￿1Quotasi;t + trend + ￿1Durationi;t + ￿1GDPi;t + "1;i;t (4)
EXPi;t = ￿2;i + ￿2;t + ￿2Quotasi;t + trend + ￿2Durationi;t + +￿2GDPi;t + "2;i;t (5)
EXPi;t = ai + bt + rFEMi;t + trend + dDurationi;t + cGDPi;t + ￿i;t (6)
where Duration denotes the duration between each two adjacent observations for an individual country.
Estimation of equation (4) is reported in Table 9. Gender quotas are relevant to the level of female
legislators (including the OECD countries) in that the proportion of female legislators in countries after
the introduction of gender quotas is 4.46 percentage points higher than that in countries without any type
of gender quotas. Column (2) is the results considering di⁄erent types of gender quota systems. Voluntary
party quotas are more relevant to female legislators in the sample that includes OECD countries. The
proportion of female legislators in countries after adopting voluntary party quotas is 5.59 percentage points
higher than that in countries without gender quotas. 35
An estimation of equation (5) is also reported in Table 9. There is a positive and signi￿cant reduced
form e⁄ect of gender quotas on social service and welfare. Government expenditures on social welfare
in countries after the introduction of gender quotas is 1.25 percentage points higher than spending in
33The mean value of the beginning year is 1973.4, and the mean value of the ending year is 2003.6.
34These countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Re,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea Republic of, Lesotho, Luxembourg,
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bahamas, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Kuwait, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, New Zealand, Oman, Singapore, Turkey, and the United States.
35On the other hand, legal quotas are more relevant in the sample excluding OECD countries. The level of female
legislators in countries after adopting legal quotas is 6.20 percentage points higher than that in countries without
quotas. These results are not reported in the table.
14countries without any type of gender quotas. Gender quotas also yield in￿ uence on general public services,
which include public debt transactions and transfers between di⁄erent levels of government. This might
be the case since it has been suggested that women are more liberal on average. 36 Therefore, female
legislators may tend to raise the public debt and transfer money to local governments in order to provide
better policies for children, the family, and women. Furthermore, regressions with the controls for di⁄erent
types of gender quotas point out that gender quotas produce e⁄ects on policy outcomes.
Estimation of equation (6) are reported in Table 10. In the cases with gender quotas as the instrument,
there is an e⁄ect of female legislators on general public services, economic a⁄airs, and social welfare.
Nevertheless, there are only reduced form e⁄ects of gender quotas on government expenditures on general
public services and social welfare, which implies that gender quotas may in￿ uence expenditures on these
two functions of government through its e⁄ect on the proportion of female legislators. An increase in
the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of government expenditures on
general public services and social welfare to GDP by 0.53 and 0.28 percentage points, respectively. In cases
considering di⁄erent types of gender quota systems, female legislators are relevant to both the expenditures
on general public services and social welfare.
Generally, gender quotas have an important e⁄ect on the representation of women in politics, and
may consequently yield a signi￿cant in￿ uence of female legislators on government expenditures on social
welfare.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether political reservations have increased expenditures on
groups that bene￿t from the mandate. While most economic research studying the e⁄ect of political
reservation for women on policy outcomes uses within-country data, the contribution of this study is to
investigate the reservation e⁄ect of women on a cross-country basis.
The results using two observations for each country suggest that there is an e⁄ect of female legislators on
government expenditures of social welfare, where the increasing representation of female legislators resulted
from a gender equality policy. In other words, gender quotas may in￿ uence policy outcomes through its
e⁄ect on the proportion of female legislators. This conclusion is made under the assumption that gender
quotas have neither a direct impact on policy outcomes nor do they in￿ uence policy outcomes through
channels other than increasing the proportion of female legislators. Civil war and stage of development
are less likely to in￿ uence countries￿decisions on introducing gender quotas.
The second part of the analysis drops countries with a beginning sampling year after 1980 and an
ending sampling year before 2000, and collects two more observations per country to capture the trend
36Lott and Kenny (1999) suggest that the in￿ uence of female voters may have been re￿ ected in the large increase
in state transfers to local governments. They also suggest that after the 1970s, women prefer big governments.
Edlund and Pande (2002) claim that women are more likely to support the Democratic Party as the divorce rate
increases.
15of policy outcomes and the level of female legislators. The increasing representation of women in politics
a⁄ects government spending decisions, especially for those issues related to women￿ s traditional role in the
family. Social welfare is again con￿rmed as the issue that is most concerning for women . An increase in
the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of expenditure on social welfare
to GDP by 0.28 percentage points. This conclusion is not driven by a time trend. To make a more careful
inference, it would be best to include as many countries as possible or collect more observations before
and after the treatment.
The results also suggest that the fast track to gender equality by mandated legal gender quotas among
developing countries has a sound e⁄ect on the representation of women in politics, but the increasing level
of female legislators in developing countries may not yet yield an impact on policy outcomes. Therefore,
continuous tracking of the data would facilitate investigation of the e⁄ect of women in politics on policy
outcomes.
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18Figure 1: Classi￿cation of expense by function of government













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 2: Mean percentage points of the level of female legislators and expenditures on policy outcomes to
GDP
Female Legislators
with OECD countries without OECD countries
Before After Obs. Before After Obs.
Quotas 6.24 18.41 56 5.82 14.45 38
(0.76) (1.36) (0.94) (1.15)
Party quotas 6.86 19.46 47 6.71 14.93 29
(0.87) (1.52) (1.16) (1.34)
Legal quotas 4.21 18.41 22 3.62 14.67 19
(0.79) (1.36) (0.56) (1.94)
No quotas 6.23 12.12 43 5.98 11.01 40
(1.06) (1.37) (1.07) (1.26)
General Public Services
with OECD countries without OECD countries
Before After Obs. Before After Obs.
Quotas 2.72 6.47 56 2.76 6.10 38
(0.25) (0.41) (0.32) (0.49)
Party quotas 2.53 6.52 47 2.46 6.06 29
(0.23) (0.41) (0.31) (0.47)
Legal quotas 2.68 6.71 22 2.62 5.81 19
(0.42) (0.86) (0.49) (0.78)
No quotas 4.20 7.00 43 4.16 7.36 40
(0.78) (0.77) (0.81) (0.80)
Defense
with OECD countries without OECD countries
Before After Obs. Before After Obs.
Quotas 2.70 1.61 56 2.90 1.59 38
(0.56) (0.20) (0.81) (0.23)
Party quotas 2.59 1.63 47 2.77 1.61 29
(0.64) (0.24) (1.02) (0.29)
Legal quotas 2.45 1.35 22 2.51 1.35 19
(0.48) (0.18) (0.55) (0.20)
No quotas 2.87 2.22 43 2.71 2.24 40
(0.55) (0.25) (0.57) (0.25)
Health
with OECD countries without OECD countries
Before After Obs. Before After Obs.
Quotas 1.86 3.15 56 1.61 2.53 38
(0.24) (0.32) (0.27) (0.33)
Party quotas 1.97 3.44 47 1.72 2.81 29
(0.27) (0.35) (0.34) (0.40)
Legal quotas 1.20 1.63 22 1.00 1.45 19
(0.24) (0.38) (0.20) (0.32)
No quotas 2.00 2.33 43 1.64 2.22 40
(0.35) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
25(continued)
Education
with OECD countries without OECD countries
Before After Obs. Before After Obs.
Quotas 2.86 3.23 56 2.83 3.25 38
(0.22) (0.27) (0.24) (0.28)
Party quotas 2.78 3.25 47 2.69 3.28 29
(0.23) (0.30) (0.25) (0.31)
Legal quotas 2.92 3.02 22 2.61 3.00 19
(0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.42)
No quotas 4.00 3.77 43 3.64 3.82 40
(0.52) (0.39) (0.34) (0.40)
Housing
with OECD countries without OECD countries
Before After Obs. Before After Obs.
Quotas 0.56 0.52 56 0.50 0.57 38
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Party quotas 0.57 0.48 47 0.51 0.53 29
(0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09)
Legal quotas 0.43 0.57 22 0.41 0.64 19
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13)
No quotas 0.92 1.02 43 0.92 1.06 40
(0.22) (0.29) (0.24) (0.31)
Economic A⁄airs
with OECD countries without OECD countries
Before After Obs. Before After Obs.
Quotas 5.29 3.25 56 5.67 3.22 38
(0.65) (0.30) (0.93) (0.33)
Party quotas 5.22 3.43 47 5.69 3.50 29
(0.72) (0.32) (1.12) (0.36)
Legal quotas 5.08 2.34 22 5.03 2.39 19
(0.70) (0.35) (0.81) (0.40)
No quotas 8.20 4.16 43 7.70 4.29 40
(1.40) (0.47) (1.31) (0.50)
Social Welfare
with OECD countries without OECD countries
Before After Obs. Before After Obs.
Quotas 5.76 9.32 56 3.73 6.62 38
(0.71) (0.90) (0.72) (0.93)
Party quotas 6.62 10.69 47 4.49 8.01 29
(0.78) (0.94) (0.88) (1.06)
Legal quotas 3.31 4.81 22 1.65 2.87 19
(1.00) (1.26) (0.44) (0.76)
No quotas 4.42 4.42 43 3.44 4.13 40
(1.03) (0.64) (0.65) (0.65)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
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a
p
i
t
a
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
a
r
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
i
n
e
a
c
h
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
.
4
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
a
r
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
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